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Bridging the Gap
Canadian Engineer Operations at Canal du
Nord–Bourlon Wood, 1918
B R I A N PA S C A S
Abstract : During the last hundred days of the Great War, the Allied armies
swept eastward past the Hindenburg Line with hammer-blow offensive
warfare. Performing their work under intense machine gun and shell fire,
engineers erected bridges and constructed roads, allowing infantry and
artillery units to pursue the retreating enemy. These combat engineers
played a vital role in battle tactics and logistical services of open warfare.
Their versatile formations contributed to the Canadian Corps’ rapid
victories, which included the successful Canal du Nord crossing leading
to the capture of Bourlon Wood in September 1918.
The battle of Bourlon Wood was an engineers’ battle. The success of the
whole operation depended on the speed with which the necessary crossings
of the Canal du Nord were provided, and the way they were maintained
and improved during the day, so as to enable the guns and infantry to be
maintained in the positions which they had reached in their advance.1

W

Battle of Canal du Nord —also referred to as
Bourlon Wood (BW) in official documents—an engineers’
battle? Most battle narratives concentrate on infantry and artillery
tactics; some analyse the war’s operational and strategic levels.
as the

1  
J.F.B. Livesay, “Canadian Engineers’ Marvellous Feats at Canal du Nord Scrap,”
The Montreal Daily Star, 5 November 1918, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29,
File 5, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC]. See also J. Castell Hopkins,
Canada at War: A Record of Heroism and Achievement 1914-1918 (Toronto: The
Canadian Annual Review, 1919), 192. Lloyd George declared: “This is an engineers’
war, … we need arms more than men….” See William Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the
First World War (London: Little, Brown, 2014), 166.
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Ancillary services receive less recognition. To refute or confirm this
“engineers’ battle” assertion, one must understand the Canadian
engineers’ logistical battlefield work in the last one hundred days of
the Great War.
“Engineers were considered, first and foremost, as fighting
troops. Each one went through the normal course of infantry
training and were individually armed and equipped as such.”2 The
military engineer (the sapper) frequently came under enemy fire while
performing engineer services in the front line. The sapper operated as
both soldier and technician.3
The Great War engineer’s numerous duties included constructing
and repairing roads, assembling portable and permanent bridges,
tunnelling and mining, laying tramway tracks, establishing water
points, and disarming booby traps. This article examines the
Canadian engineer’s role in the last months of the war, beginning
with the engineer battalions created in the spring of 1918 from field
companies and pioneer battalions. In September, these new battalions
faced an immense challenge constructing crossings and bridges while
under enemy shell and machine gun fire. Infantry, tank, artillery, and
tramways units depended on the engineers for unobstructed passage
across mine-cratered roads and the Canal du Nord, littered with
destroyed bridges, near Bourlon Wood. The engineering work, with a
focus on bridge building, is assessed during the opening day’s assault
at the Canal du Nord on 27 September.
The military engineer’s mission in the Great War was
straightforward:
The purpose of engineers is to apply engineering science to the
emergencies of modern warfare, in order to protect and assist the
troops[,] to ameliorate the conditions under which they are serving and
to facilitate locomotion and communication.4

2  
David Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2: The Organization and Administration
of the Canadian Military During the First World War (Ottawa, Service Publications,
2012), 271.
3  
Bill Rawling, Technicians of Battle: Canadian Field Engineering From PreConfederation To The Post-Cold War Era (Toronto: Military Engineering Institute
of Canada, 2001), xiii.
4  
James L. Melville, “The Canadian Engineers,” Canada in the Great World War
(Toronto: United Publishers of Canada, 1921), 38.
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reorganisation
All divisional engineers were pooled under the direct executive
command of the Canadian Corps’ Chief Engineer who became the
General Officer Commanding (GOC) Canadian engineers.5 Under
Army orders, British Royal Engineer (RE) field companies and
pioneer battalions were attached under the Canadian Corps’ Chief
Engineer when the work required additional units.6 The GOC was also
responsible for training, promotions, transfers, and postings. Thirtyeight-year-old Brig.-Gen. W. Bethune Lindsay became the Canadian
Corps’ Chief Engineer in March 1916. His promotion to major general
in December 1919 was retroactive to 1 August 1918. Lindsay was
technical adviser to Canadian Corps commander Lieut.-Gen. Sir
Arthur Currie for all engineer services. The four infantry divisions
each retained a pioneer battalion and three field companies. Three
tunnelling companies were categorised as army troops and the corps
troops included entrenching battalions and four labour battalions.7
In November 1917, Lindsay proposed engineer units with
integral labour—merging skilled and unskilled men—thereby freeing
the infantry from manual labour tasks. Before the reorganisation,
Canadian engineers planned and supervised daily infantry working
parties. This led to the motto: “engineers responsible for quality and
infantry for quantity.”8 The infantry despised these working parties,
especially the digging, and did as little as possible. The engineer
who arrived late and forgot the tools intensified the loathing. “[U]
nder these conditions the average man does not do 25% of the work
he might fairly be expected to accomplish.”9 Currie remarked that
the infantry would fight a battle one day and perform engineering

Halfdan F.H. Hertzberg, “The Re-organization of the Engineering Troops of a
Canadian Division-Great War 1914-18,” Canadian Defence Quarterly (July 1924):
46.
6  
Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2, 275.
7  
The four entrenching battalions were disbanded in August 1917 and replaced by
the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp. Two of the four labour battalions became
railway troop battalions and the other two became the 1st and 2nd Infantry Works
battalions. In mid-September, these Works battalions were disbanded to create four
infantry works companies under the authority of the Canadian Labour Group.
8  
Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 41.
9  
Secret Memorandum on Engineer Services, MG30, E100, Volume 37, File 166,
LAC.
5  
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work the next.10 A reorganisation was needed to supervise and carry
out all the engineering work itself.11 Currie realised the engineer
and machine gun units were drawing heavily on the infantry for
additional personnel and he had to stop the drain on the infantry. He
recommended expanding each engineer field company to an engineer
battalion, lumping in the pioneer battalion.12 On 27 February 1918,
Currie wrote: “…I consider this reorganization to be so necessary that I
would prefer to go without Infantry rather than without Engineers.”13
The War Office granted authority for the changes on 24 March. On
24 May, Currie ordered the engineering reorganisation, which was
finalized in late July.14 In the meantime, personnel, animals, vehicles,
and inventory stores were transferred to the new battalions.
Under the reorganisation, the engineer divisional headquarters,
field companies, pioneer battalions, base reinforcements, 5th Canadian
Division Engineers’ field companies, and two tunnelling companies
were regrouped into engineer brigades. The four infantry divisions
were each allotted a brigade. A headquarters, three battalions,
and a seventy-member pontoon bridging transport unit (PBTU)
defined the engineer brigade staffed by 3,249 officers and other ranks
(OR). A field company became an engineer battalion comprising a
headquarters and four companies, with twenty-four 3-ton lorries and
over 500 horses. On 4 June, the 2nd Brigade’s three battalions were
the last of the twelve new battalions to be established.
These four brigades reported to the Chief Engineer who
maintained a staff including field engineers for tramways, bridges,
and roads. In the war’s last months, the corps area was divided into
four parts with an engineer brigade made responsible for each part.
The same engineers remained on the same job until its completion
ensuring continuity.15 Corps troops, signals service, detached units,
and the CE Motor Transport Company also reported to the Chief
Engineer. Five army troops companies, two tramways companies,

A.M.J. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 1987), 111.
11  
Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 40.
12  
Arthur Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.
13  
A. Kerry and William McDill, The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian
Engineers, Volume 1 1749-1939 (Ottawa: The Military Association of Canada,
1962), 162.
14  
Melville, “Canadian Engineers,” 69.
15  
Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 46.
10  
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the Canadian Corps Survey Section and one “artizan” company
were amalgamated as corps troops. Detached units included the No.
3 Tunnelling Company and an anti-aircraft searchlight company.
The Canadian Engineers Reinforcement Depot (CERD) retained
fifty officers and 1,600 OR.16 The battalion ranks were augmented
throughout 1918. In September, the 8th Battalion, CE received 144
reinforcements from the CERD; 31 percent were draftees.17
Currie wrote “that much of the success of the Canadian Corps
in the final 100 days was due to the fact that they had sufficient
engineers to do the engineering work and that in those closing battles
we did not employ the infantry in that kind of work.”18 However, the
poor bloody infantry could not escape the pick and shovel burden.
On the evening of 29 August 1918, 100 OR from the 2nd Battalion,
CE were ordered to consolidate newly captured enemy territory. The
men, transporting 500 picks and 500 shovels, finally arrived at 3 a.m.
With sufficient infantry to do the work, the sappers were dismissed
from the overcrowded outpost line. The infantry dug themselves in
and secured the line.19
Currie noted after the war that a British expert “committee
found that the Canadian infantry organization and the Canadian
Engineer organization and the Canadian Machine Gun organization
was the most effective possible and therefore should be adopted for
the British.”20

canal du nord – bourlon wood operation
On 15 September 1918, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig held a strategic
conference with the First, Third, and Fourth Army commanders. He
ordered a joint operation towards Cambrai by General Sir Henry
Horne’s First Army and General Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army with
the capture of Bourlon Wood by First Army. On 23 September,

Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9, III-D-2, Volume
4811, LAC; Canadian Engineers Reorganization, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC.
17  
Patrick Dennis, Reluctant Warriors: Canadian Conscripts and the Great War
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 263.
18  
Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.
19  
Appendix H, Report by 1st Brigade, CE, Drocourt-Quéant Operations, MG30,
E100, Folder 37, File 168, LAC.
20  
Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.
16  
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Allied generalissimo Marshal Foch sanctioned four sequential
hammer-blow offensives from the River Meuse to the North Sea: a
Franco-American attack on 26 September in the Meuse-Argonne, the
British First and Third Armies attack on 27 September, a Flanders
Group (British Second Army, Belgian, and French) attack on 28
September between the sea and the River Lys, and a British Fourth
Army and French First Army attack on 29 September at the Canal
de St. Quentin.21 The Canadian Corps attached to the First Army
had to protect the Third Army’s left flank during their advance.
After Currie submitted his plans to General Horne, First Army
issued instructions on 18 September to the Canadian Corps and
Lieut.-Gen. Alexander Godley’s British XXII Corps.
The Canadian Corps with the 11th British Division and 7th
Tank Battalion under its command planned an ambitious two-phase
operation. The corps’ first phase objective: capturing Bourlon Wood
(about 2 miles east of the Canal du Nord) and the high ground about
Pilgrim’s Rest (north of Bourlon Wood), La Maison Neuve (north of
Pilgrim’s Rest) with the left flank thrown back across the plateau via
Sauchicourt Farm to the canal, and the Fontaine-Notre-Dame Line
east of Bourlon Wood. The Canadians had to capture three strongly
wired trench systems after crossing the Canal du Nord: the partiallydug Canal du Nord Line (200-500 yards east of the canal) with its
two wired trench lines and deep dugouts, the Marquion Line (a mile
farther east), and the Marcoing Line defending Bourlon village and
Bourlon Wood. Numerous fortified shell holes, concealed dugouts,
sunken roads, and pits populated the area between the canal and the
enemy’s first defence line. The second phase entailed seizing bridges
over the Canal de l’Escaut northeast of Cambrai, establishing the
necessary bridgeheads, and capturing the high ground overlooking
the Sensée Valley between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Canal du
Nord.
Previously, the Canadian Corps had received orders to attack the
Drocourt-Quéant Line on 2 September and exploit rapidly forwards,
seizing crossings over the Canal du Nord on a 5-mile front from SainsLez-Marquion to Palluel. The 7th Battalion, CE with the 4th and 5th
Army Troops Companies, CE prepared materiel for heavy bridges
at Sains-Lez-Marquion, Marquion, and 2,700 yards further north at
Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (London: Heinemann, 1931), 47374.

21  
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Sauchy-Cauchy.22 The 3rd Battalion, CE would be responsible for light
transport bridges and cork raft infantry footbridges over the canal
and the River Agache, for crossings selected on 31 August.23 However,
the canal crossings were not captured on 2 September, forcing the
postponement of the bridging operations. This delay would turn out
to be a godsend.
Two days later, Currie personally reconnoitred the Canal du Nord
after the Germans had retreated east of the canal destroying bridges
and roads as they withdrew. He concluded a frontal attack on the
German positions east of the canal would be formidable stating:
1. The canal itself is a serious obstacle,
2. The marshes on the eastern side made difficult going,
3. It is strongly defended by machine guns from the trench system
running parallel to the canal,
4. The high ground on the east gives a perfect command of the
approaches,
5. The more we advance to the eastward the more violent becomes the
enfilade fire.24

The Canal du Nord was indeed a daunting hurdle. It had been under
construction until the outbreak of war and not all was excavated and
water-filled. The canal was dry, except for shallow pools, for nearly
7.5 miles from Hermies in the south to 500 yards northeast of Inchyen-Artois at Lock 3.25 The ground rose from north to south along
the canal’s course from Arleux to Noyon connecting the Canal de la
Gerald W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1964), 433-34; War Diary [hereafter WD], 3rd Brigade, CE,
September 1918, Engineer Instructions No. C.3, 2 September 1918, LAC.
23  
WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, Operation Order No. 108, LAC;
Appendix H, Report by 1st Brigade, CE, MG30, E100, Volume 37, File 168, LAC.
24  
Hugh Urquhart, Arthur Currie: The Biography of a Great Canadian (Toronto:
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1950), 249; Mark Humphries, (ed.), The Selected Papers of Sir
Arthur Currie: Diaries, Letters, and Report to the Ministry, 1917-1933 (Waterloo:
LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 2008), 116.
25  
After the war, legions of rats from the canal infested Sains-Lez-Marquion and
Inchy-en-Artois.
22  
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Sensée with the Canal de la Somme and sloped upwards from the
Canal du Nord towards Quarry Wood and Bourlon Wood in the east.
The canal, between 20 and 40 yards wide, narrowed to about 12 yards
near Marquion. Towpaths, roughly 12 to 15-foot-wide, bordered it.
From Lock 3 to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road south of Moeuvres,
the dry canal bed was either level with the surrounding terrain or
partially excavated several feet below ground level. Narrow-gauge
tracks ran down the centre between Locks 3 and 4. Banks rising
above ground level from the chalky excavation spoil lined the canal—
similar to an aqueduct. From Moeuvres to Inchy-en-Artois, the banks’
height varied up to 20 feet. In some areas the unfinished eastern bank
was considerably lower than the western bank. These banks were
either sloped or sheer and were pockmarked with burrowed cuttings
for road and track passages. North of Inchy-en-Artois, the canal’s
interior banks were revetted with 4 feet of brick.26 At Sains-LezMarquion, the canal bed was 16 feet below the towpath.
At the Arras-Cambrai Road (see appendix A: map grid reference
W.9.d.2.4), stagnant spring water filled the canal. Farther south
(W.21.a.0.6)—about 500 yards north of Sains-Lez-Marquion—the
terrain on each side of the peaty canal became marshy in wet weather,
further widening the logistical and tactical obstacle. Numerous waterfilled drainage ditches paralleled the canal on both sides. North of
Lock 3 (W.26.c.9.4) to Palluel, the canal contained, on average, 8
feet of water. The River Agache, a sluggish swampy stream lined
with willows, ran parallel to the canal, about 300-500 yards east of
it above Lock 3 and west of the canal below the lock beside Paviland
Wood to Inchy-en-Artois.27 North of Sauchy-Cauchy, it crossed again
to the west side of the canal. The river varied in width from 6 to 15
feet. Near Sains-Lez-Marquion, the 9-foot-wide Agache ran 9 to 12
feet deep.28
In mid-September, Currie—whose corps overlooked the marsh
and the water-filled canal from Sauchy Cauchy to Sains-LezMarquion—advocated side-stepping 3,000 yards south to avoid this

WD, 1st Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 17, LAC.
W. Hastings Anderson, “The Crossing of the Canal du Nord by the First Army,
27th September, 1918,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 2, 1 (October 1924): 65; Michel
Gravel, Tough As Nails (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2006), 70.
28  
Intelligence File, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 5, LAC.
26  
27  
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serious obstacle.29 On 20 September, the 2nd Canadian Division
shifted south to Moeuvres’ northern edge, taking over a section from
the Third Army’s XVII Corps’ front line held by the 52nd British
Division. The British XXII Corps moved south occupying the old
Canadian front to 1,200 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road.
The Third Army now held a 10,500-yard dry canal stretch and the
First Army held 2,600 yards.30
The Canadian Corps’ new battle front ran 6,400 yards along
the canal’s western bank, varying 50 to 500 yards back from it.31
From its southern (E.14 central) to northern boundary (W.4.c.2.7),
the frontage encompassed the northern outskirts of Moeuvres (1,500
yards north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road), Lock 4, Inchy-enArtois, Lock 3, and Sains-Lez-Marquion. It ended 1,200 yards north
of the Arras-Cambrai Road. The Hindenburg Support Line crossed
the Canal du Nord opposite Moeuvres at E.21.a.1.7. The XXII Corps
took over control as far south as the Arras-Cambrai Road on 25
September.32 During the night of 25-26 September, the 1st and 4th
Canadian Divisions and the 11th and 56th British Divisions relieved
the 2nd Canadian Division at the canal.
“[T]he Canal du Nord was impassable on the northern 3,800
yards. The Corps had, therefore, to cross the Canal du Nord on a
front of 2,600 yards, and to expand later fanwise in a north-easterly
direction to a front exceeding 15,000 yards.”33 The corps would launch
its attack on Friday, 27 September at this constricted bottleneck from
the jumping-off line, ranging 300 to 750 yards from the canal. Only
a small portion of the artillery could be sited forwards in the narrow
gateway. Unlike the straightforward frontal attack at Amiens, Canal
du Nord incorporated “risk and manoeuver.”34 Upon returning from

Arthur Currie to Frank Underhill, 17 September 1920, MG30, E100, Volume 27,
File 7, LAC.
30  
James Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume IV 8th
August- 26th September (London: The Imperial War Museum, Nashville: the Battery
Press, 1993), 426.
31  
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Archibald Macdonell, “The Old Red Patch,” Canadian Defence
Quarterly IX, 1 (October 1931): 13.
32  
WD, Canadian Corps General Staff, Volume 37, September 1918, RG9, III-D-2,
Volume 4789, Folder 3, LAC.
33  
Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918: Interim Report
(Ottawa: Department of Militia and Defence, 1919), 57.
34  
Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Army: The Canadian Corps in the
Last 100 Days of the Great War (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2004), 110.
29  
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Canadian Corps headquarters after examining Currie’s complicated
operational plans, the deeply disturbed Horne declared three times:
“I don’t believe I ought to let them do it.” Horne’s senior staff officer
Maj.-Gen. Hastings Anderson replied: “If Currie says they can do it,
… they will.”35
The corps’ first phase—a two-division assault on the dry 2,600yard frontage—entailed three intermediate objectives marked on
maps as the Red, Green, and Blue Lines. The Red Line formed
an arc north of Sains-Lez-Marquion, curving southeast along the
Marquion Line. The Green Line included Marquion (400 yards east
of the canal and intersected by the Arras-Cambrai Road), Quarry
Wood (across from Inchy-en-Artois), a portion of Bourlon village, and
Bourlon Wood’s western border. The Blue Line stretched from south
of Sauchy-Lestrée, southeast to Pilgrim’s Rest, extending to the light
railway junction east of Bourlon Wood, and ending at the corps’
southern boundary at Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The advance to the
Blue Line was arranged as a set-piece infantry and artillery operation
under a creeping shrapnel, high explosive, and smoke barrage with
pauses at the Red and Green Lines. The 1st Canadian Division—on
the left with a 1,100-yard restricted frontage—would swing left in a
fanlike action and capture Sains-Lez-Marquion and Marquion. The
4th Canadian Division—on the right with a 1,500-yard frontage—
planned to capture Bourlon village and Bourlon Wood. They faced
three German divisions (7th Cavalry, 12th, and 187th) between
Inchy-en-Artois and the Canal de la Sensée (12,000 yards distance)
plus five more in reserve.36
The Brown Line designated the second phase’s single objective
on a 10,000 yard four-division front. From south to north, the 3rd,
4th, and 1st Canadian Divisions and the 11th British Division were to
advance to the Brown Line. The 169th Brigade, 56th British Division,
XXII Corps was left of the 11th British Division. The 3rd Canadian
Division and the 11th British Division movements needed traffic
control to avoid undue congestion.37 The second phase’s fulfillment
relied on the engineers for artillery and light railways passages. “The
Wilfred Bovey, “General Sir Arthur Currie: An Appreciation,” Canadian Defence
Quarterly XI, 2 (January 1934): 148-49.
36  
Anderson, “Crossing of the Canal du Nord”: 65; MG30, E5, Volume 3, Battle BW
Intelligence Summaries Folder, LAC.
37  
Canadian Corps Bourlon Wood Instructions No. 1, 23 September 1918, RG9,
III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 76, File 6, LAC.
35  
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success of the whole operations beyond the BLUE Line depends on
the speed with which the CANAL is bridged, and, therefore, all units
must be prepared to give the Engineers every possible facility and
assistance to enable them to complete the bridges quickly.”38 Each
phase included the Yellow Line (a line of exploitation) 1,200 yards
beyond the Blue and Brown Lines. Patrols were to be established,
enemy battery positions captured, and the frontage extended farther.39
In total, 1,347 guns and howitzers—804 from the Canadian Corps
and 543 from the XXII Corps—supported the attack.40
From Moeuvres, northwards, the enemy still occupied trench lines
east of the canal and outposts on the western side.41 Immense numbers
of machine guns populated the canal borders, with batteries and antitank guns ready to sweep the approaches. During their retreat on 2
September, the enemy had blown up the metal and wooden bridges
(some by aerial bombardment), heaved girders into the canal, and
smashed abutments. Moreover, the Germans had mined and shelled
the main roads, leaving them pitted with huge craters. Bridges
constructed adjacent to the destroyed bridges would avoid timeconsuming detours from the roads leading to the mangled bridges.
Under enemy barrages and gun fire, the engineers intended
to provide sufficient roads, bridges, and tramways for guns,
ammunition, stores, and rations for the assaulting troops. The goal
was to transport guns at Zero Hour plus four hours over the southern
crossings. The bridging operations were divided into three phases:
infantry footbridges, crossings for first-line transport (field guns,
general service wagons, and horse transport), and heavy bridges for
lorries and 17-ton 6-inch howitzers.42
There were three main military bridge classes. Light bridges were
intended for temporary use and meant for the passage of men in small
numbers. Medium pontoon and trestle bridges could carry men four
abreast, horses, and field artillery; a 90-foot-span bridge could be
1st Canadian Division, B-W Instructions No. 3, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856,
Folder 77, File 1, LAC.
39  
Map “A”, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 76, File 6, LAC.
40  
Anderson, “Crossing of the Canal du Nord”: 67.
41  
On 16 September, the post opposite Sauchy-Cauchy was captured by the Germans
resulting in eighteen missing 5th CMR men. See WD, 8th Brigade, September 1918,
LAC; Charles Henry Savage Memoir 1936, CLIP, https://www.canadianletters.ca.
42  
Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder
29, File 4, LAC; Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9,
III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC.
38  
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erected in sixty to ninety minutes under adverse conditions.43 Heavy
bridges were designed to carry all army vehicles. These metal bridges
required twelve to twenty-four hours’ work to erect. The bridge types
included cork pier (cork bales inside wooden crates), pontoon, heavy
pontoon, trestle, and heavy steel. Some bridges combined pontoons
and trestles.44
The Inglis portable military bridge—light for infantry or heavy
for all arms—was made with welded steel tubes. Each light bridge
bay measured 8 feet long, 8 feet high, and 8 feet wide. A heavy bridge
bay measured 12 feet long, 12 feet high, and 12 feet wide.45 The
sappers used the first bay, constructed on a 2-wheeled trolley, to push
the completed bridge to the other bank. A fifteen-bay bridge required
forty-six wagons to transport the materiel. Both triangular (4-legged
pyramid) and rectangular Inglis bridges were available.46 Captain
James Melville requested two Inglis rectangular heavy bridges for the
canal and trained 200 engineers in their operation by assembling and
disassembling a 216-foot-span bridge a few days before Zero Hour.47
“The Engineer preparations for the BOURLON WOOD
operations were undertaken on five day’s [sic] notice…”48 All the
corps’ resources in engineer units along with the field companies and
pioneer battalions from the 11th British Division were at Lindsay’s
disposal. Before Zero Hour, these resources had repaired shelldestroyed roads, built cross-country tracks for infantry and horse
transport, extended light tramways to the jumping-off line, carved
out dugout accommodations, and provided water for men and horses.
This pooled resource repaired 18 miles of roads (excluding artillery
tracks) up to the front line and constructed 7 miles of tramways, on

Notes on Bridging Operations, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 185, LAC.
Summary of Operations, 1918, Canadian Engineers, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964,
Folder 30, File 14, LAC.
45  
The Mark IV tank’s width with machine gun sponsons was over 13 feet. The Mark
V tank required a 14 feet, 6 inches roadway clearance. See Melville, “The Canadian
Engineers,” 43.
46  
RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4384, Folder 2, Files 1 and 3, LAC; Inglis portable bridge,
RG24-C-6-K, Volume 22002, LAC.
47  
John Gardam, Seventy Years After 1914-1918 (Stittsville, ON: Canada’s Wings,
Inc, 1983), 39; Chief Engineer, September 1918, Heavy Bridging Operations,
Appendix B, LAC.
48  
Untitled three-page report, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
43  
44  
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which petrol-driven tractors delivered over 3,000 tons of ammunition
per day.49
Initially, nine main crossings over the Canal du Nord were
devised. These crossings, from the corps’ southern boundary frontage
situated north of Moeuvres to the northern boundary above the ArrasCambrai Road, were designated “A” through “H” and “K”. “A”, “B”,
“C”, and “D” were on the dry canal bed. “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, and
“K” were over water necessitating pontoon, trestle, and steel-tube
bridges, some adjacent to destroyed bridges. Upon capturing the Blue
Line (3,000-7,000 yards east of the canal), the materiel for the heavy
bridges at “F”, “G”, and “K” would be brought up. Until then, all
heavy traffic would use “C” and “D”.50
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 1 dealt with the
locations for the construction and repair of the dry crossings, bridges,
tramways, and roads at Canal du Nord. Engineer units were assigned
to each of these services: all four engineer brigades, all five army
troops companies, both tramways companies, the four PBTUs, and
three field companies along with one pioneer battalion from the 11th
British Division. The 4th and 5th Army Troops Companies were
responsible for erecting two Inglis steel bridges at “F” and “K” on
old abutments. The 10th and 11th Battalions in the 4th Brigade, CE
were assigned “A”, “B”, and “C”. Four infantry footbridges and “D”,
“E”, “F”, and “G” were assigned to the 1st Brigade, CE. The Royal
Engineers were responsible for “H” and “K” and three footbridges.51
In the second phase, the 7th Battalion, CE would construct all
temporary bridging over the Canal de l’Escaut. Engineer brigade
detachments would assist the field artillery brigades with moving
the guns to their new positions. Sappers would reconnoitre for booby
traps and mines and repair dugouts for headquarters. In preparing
for Zero Hour, sapper parties had erected and dismantled model
bridges in the fields.52

Ibid.
James Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume V 26th
September-11th November 1918, Appendix V (London: The Imperial War Museum,
Nashville: the Battery Press, 1993), 633.
51  
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 1, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29,
File 6, LAC; For heavy bridging details, see Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No.
3, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4426, Folder 3, File 9, LAC.
52  
Narrative Operations of 2nd CDA, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 8,
LAC.
49  
50  
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Infantry from the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were to cross
at “A” and “B” and the 1st Canadian Division and the 11th British
Division at “C” and “D”. Once the bridges at “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”,
and “K” were erected, traffic would be dispersed as follows: the 3rd
Canadian Division “A” and “B”, the 4th Canadian Division “C” and
“D”, and the 1st Canadian Division “E” and “F”. The 11th British
Division’s 32nd and 34th brigades located to the right of the 56th
British Division’s 169th Brigade were assigned the “G”, “H”, and “K”
bridges.53 The three British brigades would cross the canal between
five-an-a-half and six-an-a-half hours after Zero Hour as far south as
W.15, south of Marquion.54 The “G”, “H”, and “K” bridges were still
under construction at this time. Therefore, the brigades were likely
forced to use the British-constructed footbridges erected between “G”
and “H” bridges and any salvageable German footbridges. Supply
dumps were completed and lorries with bridging materiel weighing
145 tons were ready to move during the evening of the 26th.
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instruction No. 3 dealt with water supply
work allotment for brigade and army troops.55 Open warfare conditions
required access to water supplies and ”facilities to provide for the
existence of what is practically a ‘moving city’ with a population
varying from 105,000 to 160,000 men and from 25,000 to 60,000
horses…”56 In September, the four engineer brigades organised forward
water supply sections. They searched for water sources in captured
areas, collected water samples for testing and marked wells, eventually
using pumping sets, water tank lorries, and sterilising lorries.57
In the early morning of 27 September, the Canadian Corps with
the First Army and the Third Army formed a 13-mile front facing
Cambrai. German flares illuminated the industrialised battlefield. As
Zero Hour approached (5:20 a.m., dark and misty, forty minutes before
dawn), the 1st and 4th Canadian Division shock troops were deployed
along the Moeuvres-Lock 3 jumping-off line. The nearby assembly
B.W. Instructions No. 2, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3913, Folder 34, File 5, LAC.
Addendum No. 1 to 11th Division Order 218, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder
77, File 8, LAC; 56th Division Order No. 206, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder
77, File 10, LAC.
55  
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 3, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder
29, File 6, LAC.
56  
Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9, III-D-2, Volume
4811, LAC.
57  
Summary Canadian Corps Water Supply, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 185,
LAC.
53  
54  
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areas were congested with artillery guns and limbers, ammunition
lorries and stockpiled shells, machine gun batteries, ambulances, and
transport for bridging materiel. The leading battalions spearheaded
the rush across the canal the instant the thunderous bombardment
erupted in a line of flashes. Bursting shell infernos, acrid cordite
fumes, and the ear-piercing uproar assaulted their senses. Explosions
reverberated between the banks. As dawn broke, a river of khaki
advanced behind the rapid-fire 18-pounder barrage, which had
pulverised the west bank and canal before creeping forwards 100 yards
every four minutes towards the Red Line.58 The 4.5-inch howitzers
and trench mortars swept the ground beyond the 18-pounder barrage.
Smoke drums and burning oil drums were projected across the canal,
competing with incoming gas shell salvos. Field guns, Lewis guns, and
rifle grenades silenced German machine gun posts, trench mortars,
and rifle pits near the canal.59 Although 60-pounders and howitzers of
the Canadian heavy artillery’s counter battery came into action, the
enemy had shortened the range and retaliation shelling targeted the
troops as they emerged from the canal stumbling through broke belts
of tangled wire. Private Stan Colbeck recalled: “a shell exploded right
behind us. … The screams behind us I will never forget.”60
A 187th German infantry regiment officer witnessed the attack:
It was still dark, when suddenly at 5:15 in the morning a heavy barrage
of fire rained down on the regiment’s positions. The fire was correct on
the canal. Already after 15 minutes the English attacked the canal out
of the woodlands in large masses. They were struck back. Two tanks
that tried to enter the canal area at a place where a small rail road cut
through the thick canal bank were destroyed by combined charge.61

The constricted 2,600-yard corridor south of Lock 3 permitted only
four Canadian battalions to attack simultaneously in the first wave

The creeping barrage’s rate of advance was not identical for the 1st and 4th
Divisional zones.
59  
Robert C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, CEF
1914-1925 (Montreal: The Royal Montreal Regiment, 1927), 250.
60  
James L. McWilliams and R. James Steel, The Suicide Battalion (St. Catharines,
ON: Vanwell, 1990), 175. Colbeck was wounded the next day.
61  
Gerhard F. Dose, “The 187th Infantry Regiment in Flanders, at Arras and
Cambrai
1917/18,”
http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/dose/11-Flandern-04.htm
(accessed 3 June 2018).
58  
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at 5:20 a.m. These leading under-strength units, south to north,
were the 4th Division’s 44th and 46th Battalions and the 1st
Division’s 4th and 14th Battalions. The 44th crossed the canal north
of Moeuvre, the 46th east of Inchy-en-Artois, the 4th to the left of
the 46th and the 14th south of Lock 3, 800 yards southwest of SainsLez-Marquion. All four battalions slid down and scrambled across
the dry canal bed where engineer parties were busily preparing the
four dry crossings. “Men clambered up the eastern bank like so many
hundreds of ants, while Engineers scurried around erecting scaffolds
and runways to facilitate the crossing of guns and vehicles.”62 At
7:30, parties of signal linesmen, following the advancing infantry,
extended telephone cables over the canal at Lock 3, running them
south of Sains-Lez-Marquin.63
The 4th Battalion, assembled northeast of Inchy-en-Artois,
overcame the 10 to 12-foot-high western bank and crossed near “C”
and “D”. They advanced 2,000 yards and reached the Red Line
immediately behind the barrage, having spent six minutes mopping
up the canal in their whirlwind attack. From Paviland Wood, north
of Inchy-en-Artois, the 14th Battalion crossed the River Agache over
planks. Farther north, they cut across two water-and-wire-filled
ditches, at E.2.a. north of “D”, capturing several concealed machine
gun posts near the canal bank. On a 300-yard frontage, they dropped
into the canal bed at 5:45 a.m. between “D” and Lock 3. The 1st
Brigade, CE had intended to supply ten light bridges to assist the
infantry over ditches near “D” and fifteen scaling ladders to mount
the canal banks. The ladders and bridges were never delivered.64
Instead, the storm troops climbed on one another’s shoulders to
mount the 8-foot-high west bank.65 The 13th Battalion, following
the 14th, reached the Agache, which they waded through. Farther
north they encountered a stream 5 feet deep. “This was to have been
bridged previous to the attack, but time had not permitted, so, with
William W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion CEF in the Great
War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: The Historical Committee 2nd Battalion CEF, 1947), 300.
63  
Canadian Signal Service, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 162, LAC.
64  
WD, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 17, LAC; 3rd
Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 155, LAC. The lorry
carrying the light bridges and ladders had gone astray and was never located during
the night before Zero Hour.
65  
Fetherstonhaugh, Royal Montreal Regiment, 250; Flanders’ Fields: Canadian
Voices From WWI, Episode 15, The Last Push: Canal du Nord to Mons; WD, 3rd
Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 15, LAC
62  
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their kilts floating the men waded [armpit-deep] through…”66 The
kilted 15th Battalion likewise had to cut across the Agache—some
using planks—before reaching the canal. They splashed through
ditches before crossing a footbridge opposite Sains-Lez-Marquion by
10:00 a.m.67
The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s four battalions participated
in the first phase, with the Marquion Line (Red Line) as the objective.
Their jump-off area was in the E.7.b and E.7.d sectors, east of Inchyen-Artois.68 The 46th and 44th led the attack, with the 50th and 47th
respectively leap-frogging the two leading battalions at the Sunken
Road, just east of the Canal du Nord Line. “Each section [of the 46th
Battalion] was given a rope. If there was water in there, somebody
in the section had to get out and he had to pull the rest out…”69 At
midnight before Zero Hour, 50th Battalion signallers reconnoitred
the canal bank, carrying a heavy rope for stretching across the canal.
They were surprised to find no water in it.70
The 4th Brigade, CE had provided twenty-five scaling ladders
each to the 44th and 46th Battalions for surmounting the elevated
banks. Keeping the 44th’s leading waves clear from the barrage proved
difficult owing to the rear units pressing forwards and everyone
anxious to get as quickly as possible over the canal. Accordingly, their
own gunfire cut down many men.71 The 47th companies slid down the
sloping brick-faced western wall and scaled the eastern bank with the
44th’s ladders. Some climbed broken masonry in the embankment.72
The 3rd Canadian and the 11th British Divisions crossed the canal
in preparation for the second phase to be launched at 3 p.m. Due to
the XVII British Corps’ failure to keep pace with the advance, the

Robert C. Fetherstonhaugh, The 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada
1914-1919 (Montreal: The 13th Royal Highlanders of Canada, 1925), 276.
67  
Kim Beattie, 48th Highlanders of Canada 1891-1928 (48th Highlanders of Canada,
1932), 372; WD, 15th Infantry Battalion, September 1918, Appendix 207, LAC.
68  
4th Canadian Division Report, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4797, File 83, LAC.
69  
McWilliams and Steel, Suicide Battalion, 174.
70  
Victor Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land (Calgary, Alberta Historical
Resources Foundation, 1980), 345. On 29 September, life-belts were worn over tunics
by Staffordshire brigade troops from the 46th British Division for crossing the
35-foot-wide Canal de St. Quentin. Hauling lines, planks, rafts, and mud-mats were
also provided. See R.E. Priestley, Breaking the Hindenburg Line: The Story of the
46th (North Midland) Division (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1919), 42.
71  
WD, 44th Battalion, September 1918, Appendix B, LAC.
72  
WD, 47th Battalion, September 1918, Report on Operations, LAC.
66  
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3rd Canadian Division was not engaged that day. The 11th Division
proceeded into action capturing Epinoy at 7:00 p.m.73
Chief Engineer Lindsay had “ordered his men to work under
fire to construct these logistical arteries…”74 The Canadian engineers,
following the infantry into the canal, placed four infantry footbridges
across it between “E” and “G”. Reports vary claiming four, six or
seven footbridges were thrown across the canal, but the Canadians
only carried materiel for four.75 In fact, Canadian sappers erected four
footbridges and British sappers erected three. The British sappers
assembled them about a half mile north of Sains-Lez-Marquion. The
11th Battalion, Manchester Regiment crossed over these footbridges
about 11 a.m. The British infantry bridge at “H” was converted
midday to a pontoon and trestle bridge, leaving six intact footbridges.
Additionally, 56th British Divisional engineers assembled two
footbridges 300 yards south of the Arras-Cambrai Road and two
north of it.76
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades, CE pooled their bridging
equipment for the operations, commanded by a 1st PBTU, CE officer.
All four PBTUs and the motor-driven 1st Pontoon Park, RE came
under enemy shelling and machine gun fire while hauling materiel for
light bridges and footbridges in twelve trestle wagons and twenty-one
pontoon wagons to the crossing sites. In one area, a shell killed two
horses pulling a pontoon wagon.77 In the 3rd PBTU, CE three men
were wounded and one reported missing. A mule and a horse from
this unit were killed and six horses wounded.78
The 3rd Battalion, CE constructed dry “D” and wet “E”, “F”,
and “G” crossings. At “D” (northeast of Inchy-en-Artois near a
fragmented 107-foot-span iron bridge at E.2.a) a 30-foot diameter

Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, 59-60.
Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Volume
Two (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 517.
75  
Hodgins, Brief report on the crossings over CANAL DU NORD on Sept. 27th,
1918, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC; Narrative of Bridging Operations Over Canal
du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC; WD, 1st Canadian
PBTU, CE, Appendix II, September 1918, LAC.
76  
WD, First Army, Report on First Army Operations 26th August – 11th November,
1918, Part III, LAC; Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918
Volume V, 25.
77  
Narrative in Connection with Canal du Nord–Bourlon Wood Operations, RG9,
III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 3, LAC.
78  
WD, 3rd Canadian PBTU, CE, September 1918, LAC.
73  
74  
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crater blocked a built-up road cut through the west bank. Work
began at 7:00 a.m. and a temporary detour permitted the field
artillery to cross at 8:40 a.m. The fifty sappers had two-way traffic
operational after 5:30 p.m. Two enemy machine guns firing from the
far bank at the approaches to the bridge delayed work until 1:00
p.m. at “E” near Sains-lez-Marquion, adjacent to a destroyed bridge.
The infantry had passed over in the first rush but failed to mop
up concealed tunnels and dugouts. The creeping barrage’s timetable
had prevented a thorough search. Forty-eight OR from B Company
erected a 90-foot bridge, constructed with three pontoons (owing to
10 feet of water at the canal’s centre) and two trestles, and finished
it with canvas screening at 6:25 p.m. Enemy machine guns on the
eastern bank held up construction until 12:00 p.m. at “F” northeast
of Sains-Lez-Marquion and 100 feet south of the sheared iron bridge.
As at “E”, ramps were cut through the banks. Two sapper subsections completed the 60-foot-span pontoon and trestle bridge at
1:30 p.m. Work on the light bridge at “G”, beside a demolished timber
bridge, was delayed until 1:30 p.m., owing to heavy enemy machine
gun fire from the swamp east of the canal, and finished about 4 p.m.
Three Weldon trestles with a 60-foot span were constructed above
the muddy bed. C Company with three officers and 134 OR had
constructed “F” and “G” bridges. A heavy bridge for light tanks at
“G” with footings and timber piers was started around 3 p.m. and
completed the next day at 2 p.m. involving over ten hours’ working
time. The 104-foot bridge included four 20-foot spans.79
Major Bruce Ross, 3rd Battalion, CE supervised the construction
of four footbridges and two light bridges near Sains-Lez-Marquion.
One corporal and ten OR assembled each footbridge while under
machine gun fire. Ross and his runners clashed with the fourteenmember machine gun crew, capturing seven. While throwing the first
footbridge across the canal at W.26.b.2.5, Corporal Alfred Pynn’s
group came under heavy shelling and machine gun fire. He earned
the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM). Sapper James Wyatt,
covering the hostile machine gun with his rifle, dashed across the first
completed footbridge, shot one of the remaining crew, and captured

WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, Narrative of Bourlon Wood Operations,
LAC; Alexander Macphail, Construction of Canal Crossings By the 1st Brigade, CE,
RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4809, File 195, LAC.
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two others plus the machine gun. Wyatt earned the DCM.80 All
four footbridges were completed between 9:15 and 10:00 a.m. when
Canadian and British battalions crossed over.81
An unplanned small bridge was constructed across a stream
north of Inchy-en-Artois. The 3rd Battalion, CE along with the 1st
Battalion, CE constructed three crossings over the River Agache
east of “E” and “F” where the water ran 8 feet deep. These bridges,
completed around 1:30 p.m., were made with Weldon trestles with
multiple 30-foot spans.82 The destroyed bridge on the Agache was
repaired and re-decked for two-way traffic on the 28th. A 15-footspan bridge over the Agache was completed on the 28th and another
on the 29th for traffic from “G”.
The 1st Battalion, CE tackled road and track maintenance,
dugout reconnaissance, and Blue Line area consolidation. These
combat engineers wore battle equipment and carried 120 rounds
of ammunition. The 2nd Battalion, CE repaired roads and made a
general reconnaissance for mines and booby traps. They were also
responsible for the water supply and well water testing. Access to water
in captured territory was important not only for drinking, washing,
and cooking, but also for animal transport. Normally, horses needed
watering three times a day.83 Three new pumping installations and
sufficient troughs to water 5,000 horses an hour were completed by
2:00 p.m. on the 27th.84
At Zero Hour, three officers and sixty OR from 10th Battalion,
CE assembled to construct two dry crossings. Sappers started work
at 6:00 a.m. at “A” east of Moeuvres, located below a destroyed
107-foot-span steel bridge at E.15.a. where six-foot-deep craters
embedded with mines made each embankment impassable. The foot
trail to the canal and the openings were improved. Spoil from the

14906 Supplement to the London Gazette, 2 December 1919; James Ernest Wyatt,
RG150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 10616-42, LAC.
81  
Appendix E, Narrative Canal du Nord–1st Brigade, CE, RG9, III-D-2, Volume
4809, File 195, LAC.
82  
WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, LAC.
83  
The costliest single week in Canadian animal lives occurred in the week ending 3
October 1918 when 865 animals were killed, destroyed or evacuated. See Andrew S.
McEwen, “Maintaining the Mobility of the Corps: Horses, Mules, and the Canadian
Army Veterinary Corps in the Great War” (PhD Thesis: University of Calgary,
2016), 416.
84  
Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964,
Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
80  
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thirteen-foot-high banks was used to level the 50-foot-wide canal
bed, 3 feet below ground level. The sappers completed the crossing for
one-way horse traffic at 7:50 a.m., and at 9:00 a.m. for two-way horse
traffic.85 Meanwhile, pioneers and engineers from the 63rd British
Division erected two trestle bridges, one 500 yards south of “A” at
E.15.c.2.6 and another at E.21.a.1.8. They were open to traffic by
11:30 a.m. and 6:45 p.m. respectively.86
At “B” south of Lock 4, detonated mines had left a large crater in
the existing roadway in the sunken canal bed’s centre and a smaller
one in the west embankment. Sappers filled the canal bed with spoil to
ground level. The 10th Battalion, CE completed “B” crossing for oneway horse traffic at 6:50 a.m., two-way horse traffic at 7:20 a.m., and
two-way lorry traffic at 8:20 a.m. Engineer parties were assigned to
10th Infantry Brigade battalions to investigate booby traps. Sappers
had also cut lanes through the wire in routes to the assembly areas
and constructed bridges over trenches west of the canal.87
Two officers and thirty-seven OR from the 11th Battalion, CE
were shelled as the party headed towards “C”, near a collapsed 98-footspan iron bridge at E.8.b. Four were killed and two wounded. A mine
had completely blown out the road fill at this crossing. Therefore, the
engineers needed to build up fill 18 feet from the crater’s bottom to
road level with two tanks packing in the old road material, timber
and rock fill. The crossing was ready for field artillery at 8:00 a.m.
By 1:45 p.m., lorry traffic was passing over the 60-foot planked
roadway.88 Two-way traffic ran the next day. The 4th Brigade, CE
assisted the infantry in constructing strong points and consolidating
positions gained.
The 11th British Division’s 67th Field Company, RE and East
Yorks Pioneers were delayed working on the bridge at “H”, near the
destroyed bridge at W.15.a, after the detachment lost its horses to
machine gun fire; some killed, and others stampeded. The combined

Report on Bridging the Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29,
File 4, LAC; Brief report on the crossings over Canal du Nord, RG9, III-D-2, Volume
4811, LAC.
86  
Report on the Operations of the 63rd (RN) Division from 27th September to 2nd
October, 1918, Appendix B, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 78, File 10, LAC.
87  
WD, 10th Battalion, CE, September 1918, page 126, LAC; 10th Infantry Brigade
B.W. Operations – Preparations RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 155, LAC.
88  
A. J. MacPherson, Report on Crossing Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume
3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
85  
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pontoon and trestle bridge for field guns and horse transport traffic
was finished at 7:00 p.m.89 Work commenced after 1:00 p.m. on the
two bridges at “K” near Marquion on the Arras-Cambrai Road
beside the submerged 105-foot-span iron girder bridge at W.9.d.90 The
sappers erected the medium pontoon bridge for first-line transport
by 4:50 p.m. A 120-foot-long heavy pontoon Class ‘D’ bridge, to
supplement the pontoon bridge, was ready at 7:30 p.m. to carry 3-ton
lorry traffic and 6-inch howitzers. The 32nd and 34th British infantry
brigades used these northern bridges.
A heavy bridging train arrived at Sains-Lez-Marquion at 1:00
p.m. carrying the materiel for two rectangular Inglis bridges. Work
began at 2:00 p.m. under heavy shelling at “F” beside the sheared
iron girder bridge. By 10:00 p.m., an officer and sixty-four OR
from the 5th Army Troops Company, CE with assistance from C
Company, 7th Battalion, CE had assembled a nine-bay 108-foot
bridge, ready for traffic about 1:00 p.m. on the 28th after thirteen
hours’ construction. The bridging materiel for “K” arrived late in the
afternoon of the 27th. Work commenced the next morning at 8:30
a.m. under heavy shelling. Four officers and seventy-eight OR from
the 4th Army Troops Company, CE and five officers and 150 OR from
the 4th Battalion, CE constructed the approaches and abutments,
then assembled and launched the bridge. This heavy bridge opened
for traffic before 10:00 p.m. after twelve-and-a-half hours’ work under
shell fire.91 There were no casualties.
The 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions had captured most Blue
Line objectives by 1:00 p.m. on the 27th and were firmly established
that evening.92 Also by 1:00 p.m., all four dry crossings were carrying
lorry and artillery traffic, footbridges were installed and the River
Agache bridged allowing the guns to partake in the operation’s later
stages. By 7:00 p.m. traffic flowed over bridges at “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”,

Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1. Volume 3964, Folder
29, File 4, LAC; 11th Division Report on Operations, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4798,
File 98, LAC.
90  
Canal du Nord and Bridges, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 5, LAC.
91  
Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder
29, File 4, LAC; WD, Chief Engineer, September 1918, Heavy Bridging Operations,
Appendix B, LAC; WD, 4th Army Troops Company, CE, September 1918, LAC;
WD, 5th Army Troops Company, CE, September 1918, LAC.
92  
General Staff Report, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3923, Folder 12, File 5, LAC. FontaineNotre-Dame eluded capture until the next morning by the 3rd Canadian Division.
89  
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and “K”. To the sappers’ credit, six footbridges, four dry crossings,
and nine bridges had been completed over the canal in forty hours.
The 7th Tank Battalion allocated eight Mark IV tanks to
each of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions for crushing wire
barricades, suppressing machine gun nests, and mopping up pockets
of resistance. The 4th Canadian Division’s tanks crossed in two waves,
at Zero Hour and Zero plus twenty minutes. The four leading tanks
rumbled over without incident. Owing to engine trouble, a tank in
the second wave failed to make the crossing. Another struck an antitank mine in “A” crossing’s western embankment and again in the
eastern embankment, blocking the passage after its left tractor belt
was destroyed. Another tank towed it away. Sappers used guncotton
to detonate additional detected mines.93 The 1st Canadian Division’s
eight tanks crossed the canal at E.2.c.9.8 (immediately below “D”) and
E.2.d.1.0 (just north of “C”, east of Inchy-en-Artois). Three assigned
to the 1st Brigade received direct hits. The four tanks assigned to the
3rd Brigade reached the 13th Battalion who were facing intact barbed
wire belts. One tank commander claimed he was short of petrol. All
four tanks turned back abandoning the troops. Consequently, the
13th battalion suffered heavy casualties.94 Seventeen tank personnel
and five of the sixteen tanks became casualties that day.95 At 1:00
a.m. on 28 September, six of the eight tanks (two in reserve) assigned
to the 3rd Canadian Division’s 7th Brigade crossed at E.8.d.8.0, near
“B” on their way to the Marcoing Line.
Unlike the infantry, engineers and tank crews, the artillery did
not cross the canal at Zero Hour; it operated from the western side.
Maj.-Gen. Edward Morrison, Canadian Corps Artillery commander,
explained the barrage arrangement at Canal du Nord. “[I]n order to
put on a proper barrage it was necessary to concentrate 20 brigades
of field artillery and ten brigades of heavy artillery on a front of
4,000 yards, and as close as possible to the jumping-off line in order

In one sector, the sappers removed over 200 tank mines. See Currie, Canadian
Corps Operations, 63.
94  
WD, 3rd Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 15, Tanks, LAC; RG9, III-D-2,
Volume 4804, File 154, LAC.
95  
7th Tank Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Thorpe, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 173,
LAC.
93  
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that the barrage should ‘fanout’....”96 In the first phase the 1st and
4th Canadian Divisions were each allotted ten field artillery brigades
and two heavy artillery brigades.97 On the 4th Canadian front, six
field artillery brigades, positioned about 1,500 yards from the canal,
would take part in the barrage to the Red Line. At Zero Hour and
in darkness, the other four brigades limbered up and advanced to
the canal’s western side where the barrage from eight brigades would
extend to the Green Line. The creeping barrage could not be extended
beyond the Green Line. Eight brigades positioned at the canal would
advance the barrage to the Blue Line.98 On the 1st Canadian front,
the artillery could cover the Blue Line from fixed positions instead
of leap-frogging batteries to maintain a continuous barrage.99 The
capture of Sains-Lez-Marquion involved an innovative “monkey
puzzle barrage.” Instead of moving forwards, the barrage crept
backwards from the far side of the village towards the 18-pounders
and 4.5-inch howitzers of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, Canadian Field
Artillery (CFA) which were firing at it.100
Without a preliminary bombardment, the attack was launched
with a shrapnel, high explosive, smoke, and machine gun fire barrage.
The enemy’s coloured rocket display greeted the opening barrage and
their artillery replied five minutes later resulting in heavy casualties
in the forward-sited artillery positions. Lieutenant Ronald Sykes, 201
Squadron, RAF was flying about 1,000 feet over the battlefield. “A
shell burst below me—and within a second the whole of the ground
seemed to be turning over, boiling up in brown earth that had been
thrown up and smoke from the bursting shells.”101 Around 8:00 a.m.
1st Canadian Divisional Artillery (CDA) batteries moved forwards
over a congested road leading to “D”. The 6th Battery, 2nd Brigade,
Edward Morrison, The War As Morrison Saw It: With the Conquering Canadians
from Valcartier to the Rhine (Ottawa, c1928), LAC. Another two field artillery
brigades from the 11th British Division totalled twenty-two.
97  
Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume V, 20.
98  
Artillery Notes On Operations of the Canadian Corps 27th September to October
1st, 1918, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 10, LAC. Five Royal Field
Artillery and five Canadian Field Artillery brigades provided the barrage.
99  
Gerald W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal
Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Volume I 1534-1919 (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1967), 359.
100  
WD, 2nd Brigade, CFA, September 1918, LAC; Artillery, Bourlon Wood, RG9,
III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 176, LAC.
101  
Peter Hart, The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 109.
96  
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CFA crossed first over the canal at “D”.102 All 1st and 2nd Brigade
batteries were across by 10:30 a.m.103 1st Canadian Divisional Trench
Mortar Group’s X Battery passed through “D” at 10:30 a.m. Batteries
from the 6th Brigade, CFA moved over around noon.104 The 1st
Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade traversed the dry crossings at
2:45 p.m., followed by the 2nd and 5th CDA batteries between 3:00
and 4:00 p.m. The 61st Battery, CFA cut across “A” between 3:00 and
4:00 p.m. The 59th Brigade, 11th British Divisional Artillery, Royal
Field Artillery crossed “D” sometime after 1:30 p.m. The 3rd Siege
Battery (6-inch howitzers), 1st Brigade, Canadian Garrison Artillery
(CGA), made a night crossing near the Arras-Cambrai Road during
the early hours of 28 September over a pontoon bridge, likely one of
the two “K” bridges, which the 7th Siege Battery, 1st Brigade, CGA
had used the previous afternoon.105
To feed the hungry guns, tramways rapidly transported myriad
shells to the front. The Canadians had made extensive use of trench
tramways in forward areas and light railways in rear areas. By
January 1918, the Canadian-run tramways were five times more
efficient in hauling materiel than other corps-run tramways.106 In July
1918, Canadian-constructed light railways were permitted to exceed
the normal army allotment. The Canadian Corps had permission to
do almost anything it liked with light railways.107 The No. 1 and No.
2 Tramways Companies, units in the Corps of Canadian Engineers,
were established in the spring of 1916. They “were authorized, formed,
worked, and finally were demobilized in France, and never existed as
units in any other place than the forward area.”108
Petrol-electric and petrol-driven tractors, like their light railway
steam locomotive counterparts, operated on 60-centimetre gauge track.

L.M. Firth, 6th Battery, 2nd Brigade C.F.A. (Bonn, 1919), 17, LAC.
27th September, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 176, LAC.
104  
John MacDonald (ed.), Gun-Fire: An Historical Narrative of the 4th Brigade
C.F.A. in the Great War (1914-1918) (Toronto: The Greenway Press, 1929; reprint
Naval & Military Press, 2004), 192.
105  
WD, 3rd Canadian Siege Battery, September 1918, LAC.
106  
W.J.K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War (Newton-Abbot: David &
Charles, 1967), 56.
107  
Alan M. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Uckfield,
England: The Naval & Military Press, 2009), 327, 453; Davies, Light Railways of the
First World War, 101.
108  
Francis E. Collinson, “The Canadian Engineers’ First Tramways Company’s
Work in France,” Canadian Railway and Marine World November, (1919): 575-78.
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Army railway troops operating coal-burning steam-powered trains
shuttled troops, ammunition, food, water, and other commodities
between standard-gauge railheads and intermediate dumping points.
The closest place where locomotives could safely deliver in daylight
without their steam, smoke, and sparks clearly giving away their
position was the end of the line.109 The 1 to 10-ton wagons were
uncoupled and the corps tramways troops took over at the transfer
sidings. Closer to the front, the trench tramways merged with push
trollies on trench tracks. The British, unlike the Canadians, classified
all mechanically powered steam and petrol-electric narrow-gauge trains
as light railways.110 In 1918, the tramways companies constructed 192
miles of light railway and hauled 484,222 tons of materiel.111
“The Light Railways will be pushed forward over the Canal
with all possible speed in order that Artillery Ammunition may be
delivered East of the CANAL by Light Railway and thus reduce
the amount of wheeled traffic over the bridges.”112 Operation Order
No. 18 placed the 2nd Tramways Company, CE in charge of the
60-centimetre gauge track in the Canadian area. The 6th Battalion,
CE worked on the tracks over the dry canal bed at E.8.a.9.9 near
Inchy-en-Artois easterly through E5 central and also at junction
W.26.b.1.9, north of Sains-lez-Marquion, north-easterly through
W.22 central. This tramways crossing, over water 6 feet deep built
at W.26.b.3.9, immediately north of “F”, was completed on 29
September. The 8th Battalion, CE worked on light railways in liaison
with the 2nd Tramways Company, CE. The 6th and 8th Battalions,
CE completed the tramways bridge at E.8.a.9.9, north of “C”.113 Raildelivered ammunition arrived well past the canal on Zero plus two

Davies, Light Railways, 153.
Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2, 276; Andrew Iarocci, “Sinews At War:
Transportation and Supply,” in Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the
First World War, (eds.) D. Delaney and S. Durflinger (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016),
148; David Guay, Tracks to the Trenches: Canadian Railway Troops in the Great
War (1914-1919) (Markham, ON: Fifth House, 2017), 54, 61, 72, 81; Tramways
Company, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4446, Folder 2, File 10, LAC.
111  
Canadian Corps Tramways, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 186, LAC.
112  
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 5, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4426, Folder
3, File 9, LAC.
113  
Karl Weatherbe, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company
and Battalion Canadian Engineers (Toronto: Hunter-Rose, 1928), 398; WD, 8th
Battalion, CE, September 1918, LAC.
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days, and to Bourlon village on Zero plus four days. About 3 miles of
tramways had been constructed.

conclusion
The Battle of Canal du Nord although a brilliant tactical success
was costly. The five-day operation resulted in 13,672 casualties in
the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions—3,070 more than at Vimy
Ridge, 9-14 April 1917. However, infantry reinforcements from 26
September to 1 October only numbered 2,350.114 The 20 percent loss
(7 percent more than at Amiens) matched that of Passchendaele.
Casualties from the four divisions and corps troops who fought
at Canal du Nord and at Cambrai, 26 September to 10 October,
totalled 14,849. The engineers sustained 720 casualties in September
1918.115 Engineer (including signal units) fatalities in the Great
War totalled 2,004 of the 7,180 casualties.116 Only the infantry and
artillery suffered more losses under enemy fire than the engineers.
The versatility and courage of the engineer formations—taking
on the role of combat troops when required—is reflected in the 1,582
decorations awarded to them, including 1 VC, 42 DSOs, 205 MCs,
69 DCMs, and 610 MMs.117 In a letter to Prime Minister Sir Robert
Borden, Currie wrote: “Let me tell you that those bridges were
begun not only under shell fire, but under machine gun fire, and yet
nothing could deter the work of our men.”118 Horne too, conveyed his
appreciation of the engineers’ work, acknowledging their steadiness
and dependability under enemy fire.119
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The Battle of Canal du Nord certainly can be viewed as an
engineers’ battle based on the fundamental importance of road
repair and bridge building. No less critical were the construction
of tramways and dry-weather tracks and the delivery of water to
roadside storage tanks in the conquered territory. Essentially, the
engineers contributed to the “all-arms battle” tactics in the Hundred
Days when the infantry, artillery, tanks, and aircraft maintained
excellent coordination accompanied by the “meticulous planning and
execution on behalf of the Corps’ logistical services and the engineers
in particular.”120 Currie, in a special order issued 3 October 1918,
wrote: “The initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the Engineers
contributed materially to the depth and rapidity of our advances.”121
The Canadian engineers had performed ubiquitous and indispensable
battlefield work. These adept engineers played a pivotal role in open
warfare—their crucial performance a vital factor in the Canadian
victories in the last one hundred days of the war.
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appendix a: map grid reference numbers.122
The letter grid square is A to X.

Each lettered grid square
is divided into smaller
numbered squares: 1-30 (on
some maps 1-36).

The numbered square is further
divided into four lettered squares
(quadrants): a, b, c, and d.
Lastly, this lettered square (500
yards by 500 yards) is divided
into tenths giving a position to
the nearest 50 yards.
For example, the bridge at “F” crossing was located at W.26.b.3.8
and the dry “D” crossing was located at E.2.c.8.9 south of “F”
crossing. W.21.a.55.30 denotes 5-yard accuracy.

122  
See https://library.mcmaster.ca/how-read-wwi-map-reference-number (accessed
5 February 2019)
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